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We appraise the theoretical basis and the consequent empirical work of Frank Wolak in
his study of the New Zealand Electricity Market in a report to the New Zealand Commerce
Commission released in March 2009. The report found no multilateral actions, but concluded
there was evidence of unilateral market power. We ﬁnd that the theoretical and empirical
methodologies employed to reach this position do not substantiate it, and that the building
blocks of this study provide no blue-print for study of market power in any electricity market.
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This paper is part of a wider symposium on the subject of the Wolak Report that include papers by the
authors and Seamus Hogan and Peter Jackson of Canterbury University. We thank participants at a University
of Auckland Electric Power Optimisation Centre seminar for their comments on a seminar paper covering similar
material.An Examination of Frank Wolak’s Model of Market
Power and its Application to the New Zealand
Electricity Market
1 Introduction
In March 2009 the report “An Assessment of the Performance of the New Zealand Wholesale
Electricity Market” conducted for the New Zealand competition authority was released.1 It was
the culmination of a 3-year investigation by Professor Wolak, and it reported that, while there
was no evidence of collusion in the New Zealand wholesale electricity market, there was evidence
of unilateral market power.2 In reaching this conclusion Professor Wolak drew on methodology
authored by him (Wolak (2003a and 2003b)) and empirical work that relied on that methodology.
It is our purpose to explain why Professor Wolak’s methodology is applicable in only very limited
circumstances that are typically not present in electricity markets, and that the empirical element
of the study was ﬂawed.
2 Market power in electricity markets: Wolak’s theory of 2003
In Wolak (2003a and 2003b) the market power assessment of generators uses the residual demand
facing each generator deﬁned in the conventional way for generator i as




where D(p;") and Qj(p;mcj;!j) are aggregate demand and ﬁrm j’s supply taken as given in
the choice of output by generator i, " encapsulates aggregate demand shocks, !j represents
idiosyncratic and common factors that aﬀect supply from the jth generator, and mcj is marginal
cost. This approach presumes the existence of a Cournot market equilibrium. It allows the
residual demand curve to be uncertain and to shift unpredictably between the time the generator
makes an oﬀer and when its oﬀer is dispatched under the uniform price auction used in many
electricity markets.3 This volatility in demand results in each generator submitting a set of oﬀers
to the dispatcher. The set is constructed as the Cournot price/quantity pairs that are implied for
the set of possible residual demands. It represents the generator’s oﬀer function for dispatch.4
The oﬀer function is constructed for every trading period: half hourly in the New Zealand
spot market (NZEM). Wolak (2003b) uses recorded generator oﬀer functions for California and
an assumed known marginal cost, independent of demand, to calculate the Lerner condition as
1See the New Zealand Commerce Commission (2009) at http://www.comcom.govt.nz/index.aspx (March
2010). A companion paper, Wolak (2009a), was made available in seminar presentations prior to the Com-
mission’s release of the report.
2See the summary of the Commission (2009, p.6).
3Uniform-price-auctions (UPAs) are used in at least the institutional electricity markets of the CAISO, PJM,
ERCOT and NYISO (see http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp), and the Australian elec-
tricity market (NEM) (see http://epress.anu.edu.au/cs/mobile_devices/ch11s03.html). The NZEM is described
at http://www.electricity.commission.govt.nz, All accessed 28 May 2010.The UPA dispatch process results in a
single market-clearing price.
4The oﬀer curve has to be submitted 2 hours in advance of dispatch in NZEM. It is designed to accommodate
variations in demand that arise in the half-hour dispatch period. If ﬂuctuations in marginal cost were in prospect
during this period – as may arise from network outages for example—the oﬀer curve could be constructed in a
way that reﬂected possible marginal cost scenarios – as for demand: but the result may not be a well deﬁned oﬀer
function particularly if residual demand is aﬀected by variations in marginal cost.
1an indicator of unilateral market power. Evans and Guthrie (2009) have pointed out that this
approach ignores the eﬀect on short-run marginal cost of fuel uncertainty and storage, and that
this may materially aﬀect results.
The New Zealand study follows the reasoning of Wolak (2003b, repeated in 2009a, s.3).
Given the residual demand for company i, (DRi(p))5 and the Learner condition (pi  mci)=pi =
 1="i(pi) ("i(pi) being the elasticity of demand), Wolak writes
pi = mci +
pi
 "i(pi)













is termed by Wolak an inverse semi-elasticity. Based on Equations (2) and (3) Wolak argues that
the higher is the observed inverse semi-elasticity the more the ﬁrm is actually exercising market
power. He then argues that a positive association in the data between price and the inverse semi-
elasticity of demand indicates the use of market power in the New Zealand electricity market.
We consider these two arguments separately.
3 A Relatively High inverse semi-elasticity does not indicate the
exercise of unilateral market power
Wolak correctly claims (2009a, p. 30) that
“This magnitude [level of the semi-elasticity] gives the $/MWh increase in the market-
clearing price associated with a one percent reduction in the amount of output sold
by the supplier.”
Wolak incorrectly claims (2009a, p. 29) that the
“... simpliﬁed model of expected proﬁt-maximizing oﬀer behavior [as in (2)] implies
that higher market-clearing prices should be associated with higher values of the
inverse semi-elasticity”
We make this point by means of the following Proposition assuming a linear demand function—
which Wolak (2009b) ﬁnds to be a reasonable approximation in the New Zealand market.6;7




Pa) Unilateral proﬁt maximisation yields the oﬀer price p
i = ai+bimci





Pb) Price equals marginal cost yields the oﬀer price p
i = mci and inverse semi-elasticity

i (mci) = ai bimci
100bi = 2
i ; and
5The shocks to residual demand are suppressed.
6The supply and demand functions of electricity spot markets are typically step functions as only a ﬁnite
number of price-quantity generator oﬀers and demand bids are permitted. Residual demand functions reﬂect the
step of both demand and other suppliers. The assumption of a linear demand function is suggested by Wolak’s
(2009a, 31) discussion, where he describes his method for estimating the slope of the residual demand function.
The comment that his “inverse semi-elasticities are not sensitive to the choice of the price window used to compute
them” suggests that the residual demand curve is approximately linear. The constant elasticity demand curve
yields quite unrealistic results and will not be considered.
7The Proposition is established in Appendix 6.1.
2Pc) Price equal to some convex combination of the Cournot proﬁt maximising price (p
i) and
marginal cost {i.e. p
i = mci + (p
i   mci) for "[0;1]g yields the oﬀer price p
i = mci +
100
2 




The inverse semi-elasticity of the linear demand function implies that higher prices are associated
with a lower inverse semi-elasticity. In fact, 
i of Pc) is declining in —that is, as pricing
approaches unilateral proﬁt maximisation against the residual demand curve the inverse semi-
elasticity falls in magnitude. Further, when price is chosen equal to marginal cost this inverse
semi-elasticity is twice the magnitude it would be if the ﬁrm maximised proﬁts by setting marginal
revenue to marginal cost. Thus, an observed high level of the inverse semi-elasticity does not
indicate whether market power is actually being exercised.8
Wolak’s error is to interpret the eﬀect on proﬁt of a unit reduction in output—i.e. the level of
the inverse semi-elasticity—as showing whether or not the ﬁrm is actually exercising unilateral
market power. But as the Proposition shows, the payoﬀ from such a reduction—as given by the
inverse semi-elasticity—can be higher when unilateral market power is not being exercised.
Although the pricing formulae of the Proposition have analogous forms to Wolak’s equations
(2) and (3), only Pa) is consistent with it. In Pb), for example, price equal marginal cost can
be true in both (2) and Pb) only if 
i (mci) = 0 which requires mci = ai=bi which there is no
reason to expect. The seeming inconsistency arises because the behaviour diﬀers across these
alternatives. The pricing formula of (2) and (3) are valid under the assumption that repeatedly
over an indeﬁnite period in each and every period oﬀers are determined by ﬁrms that know their
marginal cost and the set of feasible residual demand functions, and that for each and every
period choose price quantity pairs that equate marginal revenue to marginal cost. Where this
assumption is violated and ﬁrms price at a lower level than Wolak assumes, the magnitude of
their inverse semi-elasticities will be higher rather than lower, at least for one set of demand
functions.9
4 The Empirical Work
Wolak presents various data in his study of market power. His main conclusion is that oﬀer
prices and concomitant inverse semi-elasticities are positively correlated and that this indicates
the utilisation of market power by the four major generators in the New Zealand market.
We start by considering his analysis of his system (2) and (3) which we re-express as:
pi = mci() + 
i i() + #i (4)
where  is a vector of the shocks depicted in (1) and, presumably, 
i = 100, pursuant to












8Wolak (2009, s.3) does recognise the eﬀect of hedge arrangements on the ability of ﬁrms to exercise unilateral
market power in the short run, and modiﬁes his analysis by measuring residual demand as that demand remaining
after meeting hedge commitments. We do not consider this issue, for it does not aﬀect our general results.
9Generation in the NZEM utilises a variety of fuels including approximately 55%-65% by quantum of hydro.
Limited storage and variation of inﬂows to storage across time and space for both water and gas mean that the
cost structures of generators diﬀer and vary relatively and unpredictably over time. In this situation aﬃliated
actions are unlikely. Indeed, Wolak ﬁnds no aﬃliated actions in the New Zealand market (see the Commission
(2009,p. 6)). Thus one would not expect a higher than Cournot price to be set.
10Wolak gives no reason for estimating the regression equation. He does refer to Reiss and Wolak (2007) in a
claim to the eﬀect that regression produces a prediction equation.
3where # denotes variable estimate and # the error term of the respective equations. The price
variable is the oﬀer price corresponding to the quantum of dispatched generation. Linear re-
gression will produce the best—in a least squares sense—linear approximation to a function
expressing the expected value of price conditional on the explanatory variables. There are two
levels of issues. The ﬁrst concern is that (4) represents a structural equation and it remains to
be seen whether it will be consistently estimated by its conditional expectation. It will be so
estimable if E(#ijmci;i) = 0 (equivalently, E(pijmci;i) = mci + 
i i) which requires that the
error term and the explanatory variables are uncorrelated at every observation. The second layer
of issues arises because the variables in (4) are unobserved and must be estimated: in particular
marginal cost and the inverse semi elasticity require calculation. Estimation then can only be
applied to (5) and the properties of these estimates evaluated. It is well known that as (4) and






i ) 6= E(pijmci;i). Before considering this
issue further, we delve further into the nature of marginal cost and its association with residual
demand.
If marginal cost is volatile and correlated across generators then marginal cost and the inverse
semi-elasticity must be correlated because the residual demand curve embodies decisions taken
by competing generators based upon the marginal costs that they face. Where there is correlation





i . The existence of spot markets for fuel, and ﬂuctuations in fuel supplies—
such as occurs in New Zealand as a result of ﬂuctuation in water inﬂows to dams and gas supplies
and contracts—impart common shocks to the marginal costs of all gas and hydro generation
plants as the marginal cost of, particularly gas, generation increases, over the range of gas
generation.
4.1 Positive correlation between price and the inverse semi-elasticity does
not imply market power
To consider the eﬀect of correlation among generators’ marginal costs consider a duopoly of
generators with marginal cost functions mci(q) = ciq i = 1;2. In Appendix 6.2 it is shown that




100(c1+c2) and p =
Q
1=c1+1=c2
where Q is perfectly inelastic demand. Higher (lower) marginal cost of generator 2 produces a
higher (lower) market clearing price and higher (lower) inverse semi-elasticity. In consequence,
p and 
1 are positively correlated. Further, suppose that marginal costs are inﬂuenced by a
volatile nonnegative common factor, ', such that mci(q) = 'ciq for i = 1;2. Fluctuations in
the common factor yield positive correlations among p, 
1 and 
2 . Because these correlations
arise under marginal cost pricing it cannot be that positive correlations among prices and inverse
semi-elasticities imply unilateral market power is being exercised: in contrast to Wolak’s (2009a,
pp. 32–33) claim. This conclusion does not rest on mis-measurement of the variables.
4.2 The regression model
We examine the regression model taking as the null hypothesis that ﬁrms do set prices according
to Cournot, demand is linear and uncertain. While various speciﬁcations are possible, we take
demand to be DRi = ai +i  bipi where the shock, i, is white noise and potentially correlated
with mci: in this case the inverse semi-elasticity is i = (ai + i   bipi)=100bi. We consider
separately the cases where marginal cost and  are measured with error and when they not.11
11Evans and Guthrie (2009) demonstrate one source of error that results from the fact that the marginal cost of
stored fuel, water and gas, is often higher than the spot market reports. In his regressions Wolak seeks to control
4When marginal cost and the inverse semi-elasticity are measured accurately the regression
model may be written yi = pi   mci = 
i i + #i, using (4). For this equation, ordinary least
















This parameter will equal 
i if the ﬁnal covariance in this expression is zero, which it would be if
(2) held exactly in the data, or alternatively where the error term exists and is uncorrelated with
the inverse semi-elasticity. Since there is no reason to suppose (2) would hold exactly the more
interesting case arises where there is no measurement error and yet the error term exists. In this
circumstance it is likely that the error term will be correlated with the inverse semi-elasticity
because common shocks are likely to aﬀect yi and i in ways that do not preserve the linear
relationship (2). For example, common marginal cost shocks may aﬀect both residual demand12
(and thereby i) in various ways not encapsulated by (2). In this case i is not the structural
coeﬃcient 
i , and so it is not identiﬁed and consistently estimated by means of ordinary least
squares.
When marginal cost and/or the inverse semi-elasticity are measured with error the diﬃculty
of estimating a structural relationship is enhanced. Although Wolak estimates marginal cost
utilising gas-price information provided by generators to construct a counterfactual electricity
price series for aspects of his analysis—see Wolak (2009b, para. 388)—in his regression he ap-
proximates variations in marginal cost by means of time-speciﬁc dummy variables. If marginal
cost and the inverse semi-elasticity are measured with error then they will be stochastic. If
marginal cost were known, the eﬀect of measurement error in the explanatory variable, i, in
isolation from other statistical issues, generally will be to truncate the estimated coeﬃcient on
it. Although i is measured by approximation, suppose that it is measured accurately, but that
mc
#














which shows that measurement error in marginal cost will potentially materially aﬀect the es-
timation of the slope coeﬃcient in (4). There must be measurement error arising from the
unobserved valuation of stored fuel and its correlation across generators in the electricity mar-
ket. Hence, ordinary least squares applied to (5) yields biased and inconsistent estimates of the
slope coeﬃcient in (4), which we have argued is unidentiﬁed in any event.
4.3 Regression ﬁndings
In this section we consider the results of the Wolak regressions. The ﬁrst point is that Wolak
(2009a) does not report goodness of ﬁt statistics that might shed light on whether (2) holds as
a tautology. Certainly, the graphs of the NZEM system-wide prices and inverse semi-elasticities
do not support the notion of a tautology (see Figures 4.5, 4.6 and 4.8 (Wolak (2009a, 70-71)).
We report Wolak’s regression estimates of  in (5). In proposition Pc) the ﬁrm sets price at
for marginal cost by replacing marginal cost in (5) with dummy variables.
12For example, the analysis suggests that marginal cost may be positively correlated with the residual demand
shifter i, as higher system wide marginal cost yields, ceteris paribus, reductions in oﬀered supply from all
generators.
13The dummy variables used in the regressions cannot capture well variations in marginal cost that occur
continuously with considerable variation. In one of the two speciﬁcations Wolak uses the same intra-day proﬁle
is assumed. Since there can be expected to be more intra-day variation in relatively high demand days; the
speciﬁcation will under- (over-) estimate marginal cost in high (low) demand days.
5Table 1: Spot-market regression results
Table 5.1 Table 5.2
^  ^  ^  ^ 
Firm A 0:46 0:009 0:67 0:013
Firm B 0:56 0:011 0:73 0:015
Firm C 1:41 0:028 1:16 0:023
Firm D 3:81 0:073 4:54 0:087
Source: Wolak (2009a, p. 74).
a level between marginal cost and the proﬁt maximising price as p
i = mci + (p
i   mci) for
"[0;1] which results in the oﬀer price p
i = mci + 100
2 
i . We utilise this relationsip and report





recovered from the estimates of . For these estimates of  to retain
their interpretation as the extent to which pricing is above marginal cost one requires that (4)
is identiﬁed and (p
i ;mci;
i ) measured without error.
The results are reported in Table 1 for two diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the dummy variables
included in the regression to control for variations in marginal cost.The estimated s are orders
of magnitude below the 100 implied by Wolak’s methodology, and the concomitant ^ s indicate
that pricing is not far diﬀerent from pricing at marginal cost, Firm C (D), for example, would
appear to be pricing at 3% (7%) of the inverse semi-elasticity over marginal cost in the sample
period. We report in Appendix 6.3 the Wolak (2009, 73) equation estimates after adjusting for
generation committed under forward contracts. These estimates are higher than those reported
in Table 1 but far lower than those that would be consistent with his hypothesis.
Were (2) and its stochastic counterpart (4) identiﬁed, and price, marginal cost and the inverse
semi-elasticity accurately measured these regression results would falsify Wolak’s hypothesis that
the price mark-up over marginal cost be 100 times the inverse semi-elasticity. They imply it is
just 3-8% of this level. However, we consider that Wolak’s regression model is not identiﬁed
under ordinary least squares and that even if it were that there is such measurement error that
the regression estimates are simply not informative about the utilisation of unilateral market
power in the New Zealand electricity spot market.
The slope coeﬃcients of the regression do indicate a positive association between price and the
inverse semi-elasticity. However this too is uninformative, for as we have explained in Section
4.1, positive correlation between price and the inverse semi-elasticity conveys no information
about the use of unilateral market power, for it can occur when generators are not unilaterally
exercising market power at all and are instead behaving perfectly competitively.
5 Concluding comments
In his conclusion Wolak (2009a) includes the following statements
“The three lines of empirical inquiry presented in this paper are broadly consistent
with the implications of expected proﬁt-maximizing oﬀer behavior by the four large
suppliers in response to the extent of competition they face from other suppliers
on a half-hourly basis. This conclusion does not depend on any assumptions about
the functional form of aggregate demand in the market or any model of strategic
interaction among ﬁrms. Because of the data-rich multiunit auction environment
that we study, ex post half-hourly measures of the ability of a supplier to exercise
market power using the oﬀers submitted by all suppliers and the level of system
demand can be computed without either of these assumptions.”
6“We ﬁnd that each of the four large suppliers submits a higher half-hourly oﬀer price
when it has a higher half-hourly unilateral ability to exercise market power [inverse
semi-elasticity]. The half-hourly oﬀer price increases predicted by the parameter
estimates from our econometric model for typical changes in the half-hourly ability
of each supplier to exercise market power are economically signiﬁcant in the sense
that the implied oﬀer price increases can be in the range of $10/MWh to $20/MWh
during peak periods of the day.”
and
“Taken together, the empirical results in this paper demonstrate that although prices
in a multi-unit auction wholesale electricity market depend on supply and demand
conditions, actual supply conditions depend on the oﬀer curves submitted by market
participants to the wholesale market. These oﬀer curves are direct result of the
unilateral expected proﬁt-maximizing actions of suppliers given factors that they are
unable to control such as the level of demand at all locations in the New Zealand,
amount of water inﬂows to hydroelectric generation units and the price of fossil fuels
and other inputs consumed to produce electricity.”
The ﬁrst cannot be right in that it eschews Wolak’s use of Cournot equilibria, and some model
is required to interpret the results. It does admit the possibility of a linear (stochastic) demand
function for Wolak’s results. The second statement contains the erroneous claim that positive
correlation between the inverse semi-elasticity and the oﬀer price implies that unilateral market
power is being exercised. We have provided examples where the reverse is true. Further, we
have shown Wolak’s regression model (4) is not identiﬁed and confounded with measurement
error. Given this, it might have been expected that Wolak explain the reason for and basis of
his application of regression analysis. The third statement is unremarkable.
A Appendix
A.1 Firm behaviour under linear demand
The ith ﬁrm facing a linear residual demand, and which has constant marginal cost, has inverse









and under unilateral proﬁt maximisation will choose a price oﬀer that maximises
i(pi) = (pi   mci)(ai   bipi) =  mciai + (ai + bimci)pi   bip2
i:
It produces the optimal price p
i = ai+bimci




Setting price equal to marginal cost yields p
i = mci (by deﬁnition) and (by subsitution of
mc for p) the inverse semi-elasticity 
i (mci) = ai bimci
100bi .
Setting price as p
i = mci + (p
i   mci) for "[0;1] yields
p
i = mci + (
ai + bimci
2b















(2   )(ai   bimci)
200bi
Eliminating (ai  bimci)=2bi utilising the expressions for p
i and 
i yields p








Assume ﬁrm i has marginal cost function mci(q) = ciq for i = 1;2, where c1 and c2 are positive
constants. Each ﬁrm oﬀers to generate electricity at marginal cost yielding the supply schedules
qi = p=ci for i = 1;2. Firm 1’s residual demand function is DR1(p) = Q   p=c2, where Q is
aggregate demand at p = 0. Its inverse semi-elasticity is i(p) = (c2Q   p)=100 and when its
supply function is evaluated at the actual level of generation the market price is p =
Q
1=c1+1=c2.




A.3 Regression results: Net of forward commitment
Table 2: Spot-market regression results
Table 5.1 Table 5.2
^  ^  ^  ^ 
Firm A 5:08 0:0966 7:27 0:135
Firm B 4:02 0:0773 3:39 0:0655
Firm C 4:31 0:0826 3:38 0:0654
Firm D 21:6 0:3557 22:86 0:3721
Source: Wolak (2009a, p. 74).
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